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ABSTRACT 
The main objective of this paper is to highlight some significant deficiencies of the Crown's 
approach to negotiating with iwi (Maori tribes) in New Zealand with respect to settling 
Treaty of Waitangi grievances which iwi claim against the Crown. To demonstrate it firstly 
looks at the culture that the Government has developed in relation to negotiating with iwi . 
Secondly it raises some important issues regarding the structural fairness of the Crown's 
approach to resolving these grievances, and notes how the Government's culture of 
negotiating influences its approach. Thirdly it argues that in failing to consult meaningfully 
with iwi about its Proposals for settlement of claims, the Crown has breached a fiduciary 
duty it has under the Treaty of Waitangi toward iwi. Finally, the writer argues for a more 
problem-solving approach to negotiating with iwi about the resolution of Treaty claims and 
suggests some elements that may be conducive to such an approach. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) comprises 
approximately 12,500 words. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On Thursday 8 December 1994, the Minister in Charge of Treaty ofWaitangi Negotiations, 
the Hon D A M Graham, announced the Government's proposals for future negotiations of 
Treaty of Waitangi claims (the Proposals). This announcement was made after close to 
three years of in-house development of the Proposals by Government officials with no 
consultation with the wider Maori community. 
Between February and April 1995 a round of consultations on the Proposals were 
undertaken with Maori, interest groups and the public generally, and the Crown stated that 
all submissions would be "carefully considered by Government and the policy proposals 
may be modified as a result."
1 
In December 1995 the Crown released its "Report of Submissions" made on the Proposals. 
In the Foreword, Mr Graham states that the "process of policy development will go on over 
the next few months" and that he looks forward to "being able to report progress, as it is 
made". 2 However, to date little positive feedback if any has been released about such 
'progress'. In fact, there have been indications that the Crown is not willing to reconsider 
asrects of its Proposals at all . 
The writer considers that the Government's approach to date shows tell tale signs that it 
still appears to be locked into a classical or traditional school of thought relating to 
negotiation in which negotiations which "rest finally on some element of power and 
coercion". 3 This traditional approach stems from what the Government considers is its 
inherent business, that is, to rule the nation in the best interests of its constituents. 
1 Office of Treaty Settlements Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty of Waitangi Claims - Su
mmary 
(Department of Justice, Wellington, 1995) 7. 
2 Office of Treaty Settlements Report of Submissions: Crown Proposals for the Treaty of Waitangi
 Claims 
(Department of Justice, Wellington, 1995) 42. 
3 J W Burton Resovling Deep-Rooted Conflict -A Handbook (University Press of America, 1987) 5. 
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On first inspection, the Crown's process of producing its Proposals for consultation may 
seem reasonable enough. After all, one party eventually had to 'get the ball rolling' and 
begin dialogue on the issues of addressing Treaty claims. 
However, in the Government's preparatory stage of the negotiations process, two things 
concern this writer which leads her to question the fairness of the Crown's approach. 
Firstly, there are a number of structural issues relating to the Crown's development of its 
Proposals that need to be addressed. These concern the imbalance of power between the 
parties, the affect of norms on this balance of power and the way that the Crown has used 
assumptions to limit the boundaries of settlement. 
The second concern for the writer regarding the fairness of the Crown's approach to 
preparing for negotiations with iwi is that the Crown excluded Maori from meaningful 
consultation regarding major policy initiatives that affect Maori, at key stages in the 
process. In this way, the Crown failed to meet its fiduciary obligation under the Treaty of 
Waitangi to act in good faith toward its treaty Partner. 
Both these concerns are directly linked to the way that the Government's culture of ruling 
has affected the approach it has taken to preparing for negotiations with iwi. To address 
these deficiencies, it is proposed that the Crown needs to adopt a new culture of negotiation 
which embraces a more problem-solving ethic. 
Chapter One will begin by discussing on a broad front the ' culture' of governing in New 
Zealand and the relevance it holds in relation to negotiations with iwi. It is argued that the 
unilateral way the Government has gone about developing the Settlement Proposals is 
largely a by-product of the Westminster culture of governing, according to which the 
Government functions . Within this governing culture the Government has created a 'sub-
culture' of negotiating with iwi. However, this sub-culture, or approach, is incompatible 
with notions of fairness, and interpretations of the Treaty of Waitangi which promote a 
meaningful partnership between the Crown and iwi. 
Jntoduction 7 
Chapter Two discusses the structural fairness of the Government's approach in preparing for 
negotiations with iwi. Firstly, it is submitted that there exists, for a variety of reasons, a 
demonstrable power imbalance between iwi and the Crown. The writer examines the 
impact that societal and individual norms have on negotiating power and in particular what 
relevance the power of norms holds for iwi. Also addressed is the use of assumptions by 
the Crown and the effect that they have on confining the boundaries of settlement. To 
illustrate this point, particular aspects of the Settlement Proposals which have been 
highlighted as unacceptable by Maori will be considered. 
Chapter Three looks at the fairness of the Crown's approach to negotiating with iwi in the 
context of its Treaty obligations. This Chapter begins by stating that the Crown has a 
fiduciary obligation under the Treaty to act in good faith toward its Treaty Partner. 
Fundamental to this obligation is a duty to consult meaningfully with iwi on issues of major 
importance. An examination of the Crown's approach will show that the Crown has 
breached this duty. 
Chapter Four proposes that, to address the deficiencies of the Crown's approach to 
preparing for negotiations with iwi, an alternative to the traditional, power-bargaining 
framework of negotiation is required. Such an alternative might be the establishment of a 
problem-solving framework which has, as its core goal, the removal of the sense of 
historical grievances for iwi. The Crown and iwi, in preparation for the respective 
negotiations, should work together to arrive at a mutually-acceptable definition of the 
problem facing them and the issues to be resolved, and agree on principles or guidelines 
upon which they can review any outcome of negotiations to determine whether grievances 
have in fact been resolved. 
The deficiencies in the Crown's approach to negotiating with iwi and the preparation of its 
Proposals for settlement of Treaty claims draws this writer to question the fairness and 
legitimacy of the process for negotiation and therefore leaves any outcomes of negotiations 
between the Treaty Partners vulnerable to the same criticism. 
CHAPTER ONE 
'THE GOVERNMENT'S CULTURE OF NEGOTIATING' 
1.1 The Concept of 'Culture' 
Samovar, Porter, & Jain (1981) define culture as:
4 
the culmination of 'knowledge, expenences, beliefs, values, attitudes, mearungs, ... 
concepts of the universe, and material objects and possessions acquired by a large 
group of people in the course of generations through individual and group striving". 
'Culture' has an important part to play in the process of negotiations generally. This is 
because one's culture will determine how one relates to the other party, and how one 
measures the acceptability and fairness of the process and the outcome of negotiations. 
Individuals who have had experience in the field develop their own unique culture of 
negotiatin~. This may be influenced by such factors as their upbringing, th,.ir education, and 
their own personal beliefs. Companies can have a culture of negotiating, perhaps influenced 
by the nature of its business and the personalities of the members holding executive powers. 
In the same way, indigenous populations and Governments can also develop cultures of 
negotiating. In these interactions, however, one party's culture of negotiating often differs 
in many respects to that of the other party. Sometimes the parties are able to develop a 
mutually acceptable process of negotiating with elements drawn from both cultures. 
However it is not unusual for the weaker of the two (more often than not, the indigenous 
party) to be forced to yield to the other (i.e. the governing body) and operate within a 
process constructed in line with their culture of negotiations. 
4 LE Drake 'Negotiation styles in Intercultural Communication" (1995) 6 Int'l Jnl of Conflict Management 
72, 73. 
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Weisinger writes that 't,arties to cross-cultural conflict tend to see things from their own 
cultural perspectives". 
5 This implies that the further apart the cultures of the two parties 
are, the more obstacles there will be to overcome before the parties can agree on a process 
of negotiation let alone reach a mutually agreeable settlement. 
Subsequent to the release of the Proposals, it became apparent that both iwi and the Crown 
have diametrically opposed views on the process of negotiations. It is argued that this 
difference in culture has been one of the primary factors which has impacted on Maori' s 
perception of the Crown's Proposals and their process for producing them. Some of 
Maori's major criticisms are that the Proposals were produced unilaterally behind closed 
doors, that despite assurances to the contrary the Proposals were not comprehensive ( as 
they did not deal with for example Treaty issues and the distribution of any proceeds of 
settlement), and that the Proposals in the main only served the purpose of providing 
'reassurances to the general public and interested parties at the expense of potential 
claimants" . 6 
These criticisms, the writer suggests, hit at the heart of the Government's attitude toward or 
culture of negotiating with iwi, this attitude having been shaped by how the Government has 
become accustomed to governing in New Zealand. 
1.2 The Government's Culture of Ruling 
In brief, the Government structure compnses the three branches of the Parliament 
(Members of the House of Representatives), the Executive (Ministers which make up the 
operational and policy-making branch, and who are themselves Members of Parliament) and 
5 J Y Weisinger & P F Salipante 'Toward a Method of Exposing Hidden Assumptions in Multicultural 
Conflict" (1995) 6 Int'l Jnl of Conflict Management 147, 161. 
6 M H Durie "Proceedings of a Hui held at Hirangi Marae, Turangi" (1995) 25 VUWLR 109, 112. 
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the Judiciary. 7 This structure also has a Head of State ( or sovereign). In real terms, the 
Sovereign reigns, but the Government rules. 
Sovereignty has its foundation firstly in what the 'English' version of Article I of the Treaty 
ofWaitangi under which iwi sovereignty was ceded to the Crown:
8 
The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand and the 
separate and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the Confederation 
cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without reservation all the 
rights and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation or Individual Chiefs 
respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or to possess over 
their respective Territories as the sole Sovereigns thereof 
A more commonly enunciated view, however, is that sovereignty stems from the people, i.e. 
the underlying basis of the power of the Executive, or the Government of the day, is the 
support that it maintains in Parliament, the Members of Parliament in tum being themselves 
democratically elected by the constituencies of the Nation. In other words, the power that 
the Government wields originates ultimately at a grassroots level, from the individual 
members of society. In return, the Government has a responsibility to those members to 
exercise that power in a lawful manner, and in the best interests Jf the people as a Nation. 
If the Executive does not have this support, it loses its authority to rule, and an election 
must be held to determine which political party has the support to form the next 
Government. Its authority to rule therefore extends not only from Article I of the Treaty, 
but in more practical, observable terms, from the voters. As a result, the views of 'the 
people' tend to have significant influence on Government policy. 
One may observe that the governing body' s authority under the current structure can be 
traced to a source which gives it a clear legitimacy to govern or rule. Ministers have used 
7 For a brief but helpful summary of the structure of Government in New Zealand, see 'Working Under 
Proportional Representation - An Introduction for the Public Servant" (State Services Commission, 
Wellington, 1996). 
8 See above n 1. 
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this line of reasoning to argue that a division of Parliamentary sovereignty is therefore not 
an option, because no other body can simultaneously claim a slice of this legitimatizing 
source from which it gets its authority. Another way of looking at it would be to say that if 
a section of the community wanted a slice of sovereign power under the current governance 
structures they would have to establish a separate state. And this also is not contemplated 
at this point in time by Ministers. 
1.3 The Treaty of Waitangi 
By acknowledging the Treaty of Waitangi as a founding document of New Zealand, the 
Crown also acknowledges the Article II rights of Maori which it is obliged to safeguard 
under the Treaty:9 
Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes 
of New Zealand and to the respective families and individuals thereof the full 
exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and 
other properties which they may collectively or individually possess so long as it is 
their wish and desire to retain the same in their possession. 
With regard to the settlement of Treaty claims and processes for negotiation with iwi, the 
Government recognizes that its powers to rule under Article I in the best interests of the 
Nation must be tempered by the Article II rights of Maori. It is also aware that there is an 
unavoidable tension that exists between observing both Articles simultaneously, but that it 
needs to strike a balance; from time to time, the Government will have to make decisions 
will be perceived either by Maori as compromising their Article II rights, or by the general 
populous as extremely favouring Maori. 
Historically, however, a pattern has emerged in the Government's consideration of both 
Treaty Articles such that the 'balance' that successive Governments have reached has been 
more in favour of the best interests of the Nation as a whole, with the result that the Article 
9 See above nl. 
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II rights of Maori are often compromised. This is because in the Government's view, poli°" 
that favours the best interests of the nation is more likely to be supported by a greater 
number of New Zealanders, and as the basis of day-to-day Government of the Nation rests 
in the ongoing consent of the people, the Government obviously wishes to maintain that 
support. 
1.4 The Government's Culture of Negotiating with Iwi 
In sum, the Government's predominant culture developed thus far in the history of the 
evolution of our country's governance structure is that of 'ruler of the Nation' . And it rules 
effectively as sole sovereign power in the formation of policies, creation, amendment and 
repealing of legislation, and so forth, mindful of its responsibilities to the members of 
society (especially when during election time). 
Based on the above premise that the Government's prevailing culture is that of 'ruling' 
effectively as the sole sovereign, the writer argues that this culture is the primary influencing 
factor on how Government interacts with iwi in the context of preparing for negotiations. 
The Government has transplanted aspects of its culture of ' ruling' to its culture of 
negotiating with iwi. This reflects a traditional approach to negotiations, the outcome of 
whic1. rests "finally on some element of power and coercion" .
10 
It is suggested that in this manner the Crown has developed a culture of preparing for 
negotiations, and ultimately a culture of negotiating, with iwi which is inappropriate and, 
indeed, challenged by iwi as illegitimate and indefensible. The basis of this challenge rests in 
the fiduciary nature of the Crown's obligations and the nature of the relationship between 
hapu and the Crown as Partners under the Treaty ofWaitangi. 
Our country is entering into a new era. For the first time, our Government has made a 
commitment to an unprecedented and unique process of resolving all Treaty grievances 
involving negotiating settlements with iwi. For this, the Government should be given due 
10 Burton, above at n3. 
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credit. There was a time when the mere idea of the Government negotiating with a third 
party would have been seriously resisted by stalwarts of the governing elite. For, as the 
discussion above shows, our Government is in the business of ruling, and negotiating is a 
concept quite at odds with the notion of Parliamentary sovereignty. 
At the same time, the Government is aware of its precarious position in terms of its reliance 
on the support of the voters to maintain its position of power. The Crown is 'hampered by 
the pressure of dominant class interests" and Ministers 'with an eye to their electoral future, 
are aware of this". 
11 One might go so far as to say that it is a habitual reaction of 
Governments to 'formulate policy judgments with an eye to winning public support for 
them" 12 - a survival instinct. 
As a result, the culture of ruling has had a huge impact on the way that the Government has 
gone about preparing for negotiations with iwi. Rather than enter into meaningful 
consultation with Maori about possible options for a process of settling Treaty claims the 
Government took a course of action altogether consistent with its culture of ruling. Firstly, 
it geared the development of its Proposals in such a way that they were agreeable to the 
majority of the population and in that sense less of a political risk. Secondly, the 
Government developed these Proposals in isolation from the wider Maori community which 
en(loled it to rdease them to the voting public with the clear message that they in fact 
represented the Crown's preferred view on the boundaries of settling Treaty claims. This 
had the effect of establishing the agenda or setting the benchmark for subsequent 
discussions on settlement of Treaty claims. This placed iwi in a disadvantageous position 
because in disagreeing with many of the substantive Proposals they not only had to take on 
the Government bureaucracy - a formidable force in itself - but also of the 'wider public'. 
In addition, in using this approach the Crown had also acted outside its fiduciary obligations 
under the Treaty ofWaitangi to act in good faith toward its Treaty Partner in that it omitted 
to consult meaningfully on a major issue affecting Maori. 
11 R Walker "Pushing the Envelope" Metro Magazine, September 1994. 
12 H H Saunders 'We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The Importance of Pre-negotiating Phases" 
(1985) 1 Negotiation Jnl 249, 256. 
• • • 
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These issues all combine to add weight to the call for a review of the process by which the 
Crown has prepared for negotiations with iwi and any outcomes emerging from that process 
of negotiation. Therefore, although on one level the Government might be commended for 
making a commitment to resolving all Treaty claims, the potential of this policy for 
equitably resolving such claims has been largely whittled away by the way that the 
Government has set the scene for negotiations. 
In the following two Chapters, the writer will concentrate on the issues raised in this 
section of the paper. Chapter Two looks at the structural fairness of the Crown's 
negotiations process, particularly the issues of power imbalance between the parties, the 
affect of norms and the use of assumptions by the Crown. Chapter Three argues a 
deficiency in the Crown's preparation for negotiations on the basis that it did not meet its 
Treaty obligation to meaningfully consult with iwi on issues of major significance for Maori . 
CHAPTER TWO 
'STRUCTURAL FAIRNESS OF THE 
NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS' 
2.1 Introduction 
In this part of the paper I intend to establish that there is an inherent lack of structural 
fairness about the Crown's Treaty claims settlement process. The writer achieves this by 
examining issues of power imbalance, the impact of norms and the use of assumptions by 
the Crown. I begin below with an introduction to the concept of structural fairness . 
2.2 Structural 'Fairness' 
On the relevance of fairness to negotiations, Albin (1993) writes that it: 
13 
influence[s] the "give-and-take" in the bargaining process, help[s] parties to forge 
agreement, and help[ s] to determine whether a particular outcome will be viewed as 
satisfactory, and thus be honoured in the long run. Notions of fairness may create a 
motivation to resolve a particular problem through negotiation in the first place. 
In addition, ensuring fairness in all aspects of negotiations is not only benefk al in terms of 
achieving a maximum combined satisfaction for both of the negotiating parties, but it lends 
credibility to and maintains the integrity of the process. 
Albin considers that there are four broad categories of fairness: structural, process, 
13 C Albin "The Role of Fairness in Negotiation" (1993) 9 Negotiation Jnl 223. 
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procedural and outcome. In brief, the concept of structural fairness relates to: 14 
... the overarching structure of the negotiation process which, in tum, reflects more or 
less the structure of the dispute and overall relations between parties. 
Process fairness encompasses "the extent to which parties .. . relate to and treat each other 
"fairly", including any use of coercive tactics by one party against the other. 15 Procedural 
faimess 16 concerns the 'how' aspect of arriving at any agreement, that is any tools, 
structures, etc. Outcome fairness refers to "the extent to which parties actually consider 
[the ultimate] allocation [of benefits and burdens] fair after the fact." 17 
Information about structural issues concerning the proposed process of settlement of Treaty 
claims is of special interest to this author, not only because it provides valuable insight into 
the fairness of the Crown's negotiations process, but also because it reveals much about 
how the Crown interprets its fiduciary obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi and how it 
views its relationship with iwi as its Treaty Partner. 
2.3 Imbalance of Negotiating Power 
The negotiating power of the respective parties 1s an important consideration when 
examining the structural fairness of any process of negotiation. Thibaut and Kelly (1959) 
define power as: 18 
the ability of one person or group to affect another person's or group's outcomes such 
that the degree of power comes to be the potential range of outcomes that one can 
determine for the other. 
14 Above at nl3 , 226. 
15 Above at nl3, 228. 
16Above at nl3, 234. 
17 Above at nl3 , 237. 
18 PH Gulliver Disputes and Negotiations: A Cross-cultural Perspective (Academic Press, London, 1979) 
188. 
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In other words, a balance of power between the parties would manifest itself as an equal 
ability between them to leverage their respective positions to their benefit, or to succeed in 
producing a concession from the other on some contentious issue. Munro captures the 
fundamentals of the imbalance in power between Maori and the Crown, when she writes: 
19 
The Crown wields control over the negotiation process; it has skilled and experienced 
advisors and negotiators; and it can, for the most part, pick when and on what terms it 
wants to negotiate, and whether or not to settle. Maori are in a comparatively weak 
position. They have few human and financial resources; they cannot enter into 
negotiations without a measure of political largesse or as a result of judicial favour; 
and are often unable to walk away from a settlement, either because their needs are 
pressing, or for fear that, without settlement, the crown will act or omit to act so as to 
prejudice Maori interest. 
These factors that impact on the negotiating power of the parties relate to all stages of the 
negotiations process, from the preliminary or preparatory stages of determining the 
boundaries of settlement through to the negotiations proper and the outcome of any 
negotiations. 
The Crown's act of publishing its Proposals seems to particularly exemplify the power that 
it has over iwi. It had the human and financial resources to develop the Proposals and also 
to implement a communication strategy about them. In doing so, the Crown had the 
important 'first word' on the issue of resolving Treaty claims, setting the agenda for 
negotiations and the point of departure for what was to be all ensuing dialogue nation-wide 
on the issue of settlement. The effect was that many New Zealanders became predisposed 
towards the Crown's Proposals which increased the Crown's control over determining the 
boundaries of settlement and, hence, its negotiating power. Neutralizing this effect 
presented a formidable challenge for iwi. 
19 J M Munro The Treaty of Waitangi and the Sealord Deal (Law Faculty, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 1993) 21. 
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Indications are that the Crown has chosen to ignore the realities facing iwi regarding access 
to resources. Consider, for example, the following quote from the Minister in Charge of 
Treaty ofWaitangi Negotiations, Douglas Graham, on the Government Proposals:20 
Well, when people say it won't work and it's terrible and all the rest of it, I have to 
ask them, what would you do and when I do that there's dead silence. 
This statement is indicative of the general attitude which the Crown has displayed 
throughout the settlement Proposals episode. The Crown, having given Maori only a few 
months to consider the Proposals, expected iwi fully understand the details, undertake a full 
analysis, obtain feedback from their iwi members, develop their own comprehensive strategy 
and have it ready to present as an alternative - all of this with severely limited resources. In 
contrast, the Crown took close to three years and an undoubtedly considerable amount of 
money to develop the Proposals without the impediments of having to consult with a wide 
audience. 
The Crown's attitude also seems to be that it is not overly concerned about the effect iwi 
will have on the Proposals and the final outcome of negotiations:21 
I'm not asking ... the Maori people to agree to anything ... . .tf [Maori claimants] don't 
wish to negotiate that's their choice. 
This seems to be saying that even if iwi disagree with the Proposals for settlement of Treaty 
claims, the Crown will go ahead regardless and implement those Proposals as Government 
policy. The other disturbing thing that Mr Graham's comment reveals is that he seems to 
believe that all iwi claimants have other choices available to them besides negotiating with 
the Crown on the Crown's terms. 
20 Radio New Zealand "Morning Report" 30 November 1994. 
21 Ibid. 
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However, it is the exception rather than the rule that iwi have other realistic 'choices' 
besides negotiating.22 The very reason that iwi make claims to the Waitangi Tribunal is that 
they seek redress from the Crown for historical losses. The overwhelming majority of this 
loss results from the effects of colonization which also involved systematic dispossession of 
Maori from their land and resources. This depleted their economic base which has 
profoundly affected iwi's ability to provide adequately for their people. To this day, many 
iwi members are impoverished and reliant on the perpetrator of these past injustices, the 
Crown, for their sole source of income - a bitter irony to have to live with day to day. 
Other downstream effects of colonization are that in the areas of employment, health and 
education Maori feature disproportionately as compared with non-Maori. 
Is preserving this state of affairs the 'choice' that the Minister is asking iwi to consider? 
The absence of any alternatives, let alone satisfactory ones, for a negotiating party signals 
an absence of a key source of negotiating power. 
Considering that iwi are, relatively speaking, less prepared than the Crown to negotiate in 
that they have fewer financial and human resources, and given the impacts of agenda setting 
on and the absence of realistic alternatives for iwi, it appears that many iwi on lack a 
significant measure of negotiating power vis-a-vis the Crown. 
2.4 The Impact of Norms 
2.4.1 Introduction 
'Norms' are certain "standards" established within society, or "customary behaviour". 23 In 
terms of structural fairness of the negotiations process, their impact is far-reaching in that 
together with rights and duties they constitute the building blocks of the boundaries of 
22 J Kelsey "The Mystery Envelope: What is the Government up to? (Public Meeting on the Fiscal Envelope, 
Wellington, December 1994)" in L Pihama (ed) The Fiscal Envelope - Economics, Politics and 
Colonisation (Moko Productions, 1995) 22. 
23 RE Allen (ed) The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (8 ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990). 
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settlement of Treaty claims including the process for negotiation. They also have a 
profound affect on the respective power of the negotiating parties which, as discussed 
above, is a primary issue when considering structural fairness. 
2.4.2 The Power of the Norms of the 'Majority' 
Because norms are strewn throughout our everyday lives, their impact on our day-to-day 
dealings and interactions with other members of the community tend to be taken for 
granted. For example, Behrendt writes of how Aboriginals in Australia are affected by the 
powerful use of the norms of the dominant society:24 
Where Aboriginal people conformed with the values of the dominant society they could 
receive the protection of the legal system. Where they lived outside of those values, 
maintaining the traditional cultural values and/or living traditional lifestyles, the legal 
system would provide no protection at all. T.he point to be taken from this is that there 
is clear evidence that the existing legal system is not able to adjust to recognizing the 
cultural values of other groups. In fact, it requires compliance with accepted norms 
before it offers protection. 
In New Zealand also, the power of the norm is inescapable. In reference to the 'Haka Party 
Incident' at Auckland University in 1979, Hazlehurst comments on how norms can be 
communicated through the media, amplifying their potency:25 
Middle class Pakeha society had a powerful articulator of group ideology and 
interests - the media ... the press, radio and television transmitted news and 
interpretations of the confrontation .... by implication ... [the protest by Maori against 
the use of the haka by university students] was seen as an attack of the working ( or 
unemployed) lower classes upon the 'respectable', 'law abiding', 'hardworking' middle 
24 L Behrendt Aboriginal Dispute Resoulution: A Step Towards Self-determination and Community 
Autonomy (The Federal Press, Sydney, 1995) 5. 
25 K M Hazlehurst Racial Conflict and Resolution in new Zealand - The Haka Party Incident and its 
Aftermath I 979-1980 (Peace Research Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National 
University, Canberra 1988) 53. 
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classes. Such a challenge to the status quo could easily be seen as a challenge to the 
nation's stability and well being. 
The two preceding quotes give an indication of what in essence it is that gives norms the 
power to affect the actions of other members and sectors of society. They indicate that the 
existence of norms in themselves are not sufficient to make an impact. As a general rule, it 
is the dominant culture's set of norms that has maximum force . The 'dominant' set of 
norms may usually be identified as those which a majority of the population shares. In 
terms of sheer numbers, their force far outweighs those of any minority population (more 
rarely, a set of norms may also achieve dominance due to the power of one group to 
effectively communicate and/or enforce those norms regardless of whether it contains more 
members than any rival group). 
In the New Zealand experience, there are admittedly difficulties in defining exactly who\p, 
norms constitute the dominant ones. It would be ~versimplifying things to merely divide the 
population into two camps of Maori and non-Maori, arguing that the Maori minority has 
one set of norms and the non-Maori majority has another, and concluding therefore that the 
dominant set of norms must be those of the non-Maori majority. There exists within the 
non-Maori community different groups, not the least of which in terms of numbers include 
white (Pakeha) New Zealanders. Breaking it down even further, there are also different 
groups within the Pakeha community, such as upper, middle and lower classes, rural and 
urban, and the list goes on. Each in a general sense (allowing for a certain degree of 
interlinkage and crossover) has their own set of norms. However if the dominance of norms 
stems from numbers, chances are that they would exist in the non-Maori sector of New 
Zealand or (because other ethnic minority groups may share similarities of culture) more 
precisely the Pakeha sector. 
This has major implications for Maori . Being a minority in New Zealand their norms will 
have less force in general, and in particular where it most counts relative to the negotiation 
of Treaty settlements - on governmental policy makers and ultimately iwi's negotiating 
power. As mentioned above, Ministers wish to maintain the voters support, especially with 
the MMP elections close at hand. The Government would want to satisfy the majority of 
II 
II 
• 
• 
Structural Fairness of the Negotiations Process 2 2 
voters' interests, and it is particularly mindful that many taxpayers have very passionate 
views concerning certain aspects of the Proposals. For example, to some taxpayers just the 
thought of their money and Government assets to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars 
being allocated to the settlement of Treaty claims would create a "white backlash", 
especially "where vested interests were threatened". 26 It is therefore not inconceivable that 
the Government would strive to incorporate the norms of the majority population into the 
Proposals for settlement of Treaty claims. 
Burton states that "authorities who attempt to impose the norms of the powerful are, in 
themselves, a source of conflict".27 If this is true, it sends a clear message to the majority 
population and the Government that they themselves are a source of much of the conflict 
that currently exists between iwi and the Crown. This is a clear case of 'majority rules', and 
where this culture exists the voice of the minority is lost. 
Once the power of norms in everyday human interactions is comprehended, one can begin 
to appreciate the tremendous potential for employing norms as tools to increase negotiating 
power. In the remainder of the discussion on norms below, I will highlight some of the 
specific ways in which norms may be employed explicitly by the Crown and iwi and also 
give other examples of how norms impact directly on the negotiating power of the parties 
and hence the ultimate fairness of the negotiations process. 
2.4.3 The Use ofNorms Relating to Principles ofNatural Justice 
Parties "frequently endorse norms - and interpretations of them - which best favour their 
interests", 28 or even manipulate norms "by selective interpretation and biased application". 29 
This use of norms may be observed in the context of negotiations between the Treaty 
Partners. For example, the following norms are a selection from the Crown principles for 
26 Walker, above at nl 1. 
27 Burton, above at n3 , 18. 
28 Albin, above at n13, 224. 
29 Gulliver, above at n18, 192. 
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settlement of Treaty claims:30 
"In attempting to resolve outstanding claims the Crown should not create further 
injustices"; 
"The Crown has a duty to act in the best interests of all New Zealanders"; and 
"As settlements are to be durable, they must be fair, sustainable, and remove a sense of 
grievance". 
These norms have their foundations in equity, at least in a utilitarian sense. Their nature, 
therefore, allows the Crown to proceed with a measure of confidence that their Proposals 
are fair and reasonable. On this basis ( all other things being equal), the Crown can convince 
other sections of the community that these Proposals are in fact fair, thereby boosting its 
support and ultimately negotiating power and reducing that of the other party. 
The difficulty is, however, that the Crown's norms actually conflict with norms commonly 
enunciated by iwi in response to its Proposals which also reflect principles of natural justice, 
so they are fairly robust in terms of fairness . For instance: 
"Each case must be determined on its merits."31 
" ... both sides should be heard before a decision is given ... "32 
"Minerals and standing timber are constituent elements of the land ownership itself. "33 
"[Land owners are] entitled to take advantage of advances in technology to exploit the 
resources on their lands."34 
It would appear to follow that as the Crown is able to employ norms to increase their 
negotiating power and leverage their respective interests, so iwi should also bt: in a position 
to employ norms and reduce the power of the Crown. This might lead one to conclude that 
30 Above at n2, p7. 
31 Above at n2, p42. 
32 Above at n2, p2 l. 
33 Above at n2, p73. 
34 Above at n2, p74. 
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there appears to be a stand-off in which no one party is more 'correct' or 'right' than the 
other - each party has simply prioritised the applicable principles of natural justice so that 
one principle takes precedence over another competing principle resulting in a zero sum 
effect. However, there are further kinds of norms and uses of them that do appear to 
exacerbate iwi's lack of negotiating power. 
2.4.4 The Government's Use of 'Status Ouo' Norms 
In addition to using norms in reference to principles of natural justice, the Government has 
the luxury of having built up its public support base as an 'institution' which should be 
protected at all costs. There is often significant support to maintain the societal status quo 
(which may or may not include the general balance of power between Maori and non-Maori 
or distribution of burdens and benefits as perceived by some non-Maori). Observing the 
norms of society, Burton writes:35 
Societies have always been in potential conflict because some sections drive toward 
change to fulfil their human needs, while other fear change and its threat to their 
interests. Change has traditionally been regarded as malign and anti-social. We have 
not developed a language for it, except a negative one - revolt, revolution, dissent, 
terrorism. 
Therefore, any perceived threat to that institution or the status quo by one party is likely to 
result in a measure of resistance. Maori and their claims for redress (which often argues 
strongly for the return of key natural resources) may be perceived as a threat. As such, they 
constantly have to defend their interests, rights and positions. According to Gulliver, in 
this defensive position iwi are being told by major sectors of the community that they:36 
"ought morally to accede to the (Government] ... refusal to accede will be 
disadvantageous to the [iwi], for [it] invites the possibility of adverse interference from 
35 Burton, above at n3, 19. 
36 Above at n2, 191 . 
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the outside, now or later, should [it] refuse .. .In addition, there may be reference to the 
ongoing social life of the participants and to their future relationships, needs, and 
prospects in the wider society that have bearing on the current negotiations. 
The key word in the above quote is 'ought' . It implies that in some sense the ideas 
communicated are actually norms. For instance, in very simple terms the following norm 
could be distilled from the quote above: 
"one should not rock the boat" . 
Of course, there may be other more sophisticated interpretations of the norm contained in 
Gulliver's quote. More than likely, there are a number or family of them. Again, the norm 
communicated is being used in support of the Crown's Proposals, i.e.: 
'The boat' is 'the establishment', the 'status quo', the structures of Government. The 
Government has formulated a set of Proposals, and what more, they are based on 
principles of fairness . If one attacks the Proposals, then one attacks the establishment, 
and that is undesirable. 
The use of such norms by the majority, therefore, acts as a significant drain on the 
effectiveness of iwi to promote their views regarding the Proposals, and so diminishes their 
power to negotiate . 
2.4.5 The Use ofNorms relating to Behaviour 
Norms, says Gulliver, are also powerful tools in negotiations in that "the party who has 
conformed to them may have powerful support against his opponent who has contravened 
them."37 An example of this kind of norm stems from the statement that the Government 
has made major achievements to date in terms of progressing the claims settlement issue 
37 Gulliver, above at nl8, 191. 
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with iwi, and even that iwi have been fortunate to be offered as much as they have been:38 
Those who considered the envelope to be too generous suggested that Maori do not 
deserve compensation and that they have benefited from years of European 
'civilisation' .. .. since Maori have rejected the envelope, the generous offer to them 
should be withdrawn. 
There seems to be a couple of norms underlying this statement. For example, there is an 
impression that there have been disproportionate contributions made to the New Zealand 
society by the European settlers and their descendants on the one hand and Maori and their 
descendants on the other; that colonisation by the former has resulted in innumerable 
benefits to Maori, but that Maori have not provided benefits to the same degree. This being 
the case, further benefits accruing to Maori would seem to worsen this state of affairs. The 
norm communicated therefore seems to be that, in a relationship where it is intended that 
both will contribute equally and share equally in any benefits of that relationship, any major 
breach of that arrangement would be grossly unfair. It seems that the receipt of proceeds 
from the settlement of Treaty claims is the last straw for a number of New Zealanders who 
think that Maori have already received more than their fair share from the relationship. 
Moreover, it is implicit in the quote above is that 'one should not be greedy' . It is being 
implied that iwi are being greedy in arguing for more than what the Crown is actually 
prepared to give, and this behaviour is viewed in a negative light that results in a reduction 
of support and hence negotiating power for iwi. 
Another underlying norm is that the Government's behaviour of making progress is 'good'; 
the Government may be seen to be committing itself to a rational and 'logical'39 process of 
negotiating settlements with iwi in progressing the resolution of Treaty claims. Moreover, 
media reports indicate that although the majority of voters thought that the Government's 
approach to negotiating settlements with iwi may not be perfect, it still got 'brownie points' 
38 Above at n2, q42. 
39 See "Procedure for Settling Treaty Claims" Radio New Zealand "Mana News " 23 June 1994. 
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from them for their efforts. 40 This illustrates that, even in the face of major criticism, the 
Government still manages to maintain huge support on balance. 
The implication for iwi is that because the dominant societal norm is that progress is good, 
impediments to this 'progress' are seen in a negative light. As iwi oppose many of the 
Crown Proposals, they are perceived by many to be creating unnecessary delays to the 
progression of an issue that the Government has put a lot of effort into trying to resolve. In 
addition, this also implies that iwi are being unreasonable:41 
A working assumption that often explains poor outcomes is the premise that if we are 
not making progress, and if I am being reasonable, then you are being unreasonable. 
Put another way, the assumption in many conflict situations is that if one side is 
responding rationally to its perceived choice, then the lack of progress is the fault of 
the other side. 
The protest actions of some Maori against the Proposals have also resulted in a barrage of 
normative statements being applied by many New Zealanders with respect to the entitlement 
of iwi to redress for past losses. For example, these protest actions included the 
reclamation of authority by certain Maori groups over sites of significant importance by 
physical occupation of those sites. The lawfulness of these occupations and the actions of 
some of the participants were often called into question. This led to debate on whether 
those Maori ought to maintain their entitlement to redress. 
Normative statements made in support of the iwi claimants can go some way toward 
addressing the imbalance of power in favour of the Crown which stems from the use of 
40 In "Thumbs down on Maori deals" Sunday Star Times, 8 September 1996, it was reported that "Most 
voters don't think the Government's fiscal envelope proposal has been successful but give ministers credit 
for making progress in settling Maori claims". 
41 R Fisher "The Power of Looking at 'Their' Choice: The South African Case" (1986) 2 Negotiation Jnl 
129, 129. 
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norms - for example:42 
Clearly it would not be acceptable to wider New Zealand for a thief to steal a new car 
and say 150 years later that he will not return the car to its rightful owner since it has 
gained vintage status with special qualities to be appreciated by all. 
However, iwi are particularly vulnerable in these times to the erosion of their negotiating 
power stemming from norms when media scaremongering combined with the general lack 
of an enlightened New Zealand public exacerbates the racial tensions in the community. 
Norms such as those expounded above ultimately lead to statements that Maori are 
"exploiting the role of the victim", 43 this even in the face of references by iwi to established 
norms that define their rights as tangata whenua - rights which have been, and continue to 
b infri. d 44 e, nge . 
2.4.6 Summary 
It is unclear to this writer whether, generally, the relevance of norms and the potential they 
have to impact on the negotiating power of both the Crown and iwi is fully appreciated in 
New Zealand. The preceding discussion raises the issue as one that deserves not to be 
ignored in the context of Crown-iwi negotiations as norms have a definite potential to 
impact on the power imbalance between the Treaty Partners to the detriment of iwi. 
2.5 The Use of Assumptions - Crown Control Over the Limits and Boundaries of 
Settlement 
Assumptions may be defined as the act or instance of accepting something to be true, 
without proof, for the purpose of argument or action. 45 The use of assumptions also needs 
42 Above at n2, 56. 
43 
H Gadlin "Conflict Resolution, Cultural Differences, and the Culture of Racism" (1994) 10 Negotiation 
Jnl 33 , 41. 
44 Gulliver, above at nl8, 192. 
45 Allen, above at n23 . 
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to be considered when determining issues of structural fairness, particularly the issue 
constraints of any negotiations. Like norms, the use of assumptions by the Crown when 
combined with its greater negotiating power and control over the negotiation process places 
artificial constraints on the boundaries of settlement, thereby affecting the fairness of any 
outcome. 
The Government has used a variety of assumptions which fit comfortably with the norms 
that it has used as a basis for its Proposals. Some of these assumptions have been selected 
by the writer for discussion below. It is contended that these and others used by the Crown 
have their foundation in "traditional political theory" relating to "concepts of law and order, 
the common good, majority decision making, 'democracy' and the right to rule and to 
expect obedience" . 46 This relates directly to the discussion in Chapter One about the 
Government's culture of ruling and how it has affected the way in which the Crown has 
chosen to deal with iwi in the process of negotiations. The Government's act of unilaterally 
making assumptions reflects its belief that it is entitled to do so as the sole ruler of the state. 
This approach is criticized by the writer in that the assumptions were taken to be universally 
acceptable when in actual fact the Crown failed to test the robustness of these assumptions 
by obtaining feedback from iwi regarding their acceptability. This presents a further ground 
upon which the fairness of the Proposals may be questioned, and leaves the Proposals open 
to the criticism that they cater to the interests of the majority population. Durie observes 
that:47 
Of the seven Settlement Principles, only one gives any indication of fairness to the 
claimants; the others appear to provide reassurances for non-claimants. While it is 
appropriate that the rights of others must be protected, the resolution of proven 
claims must be guided primarily by the principles of natural justice, 48 not political 
expediencies or popular support .... [it] suggests other principles which for the most 
46 Burton, above at n3, 18. 
47 Durie, above at n6, 112. 
48 The difficulty with conflicting principles of ' natural justice' , however, is noted in the discussion of norms 
above, Chapter Two, 2.4. 
I 
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part provide reassurances to the general public and interested parties at the expense of 
potential claimants. 
In defence of the Crown, one might argue that as consultation with Ma.ori was still pending, 
re-examination of and amendment to the Proposals was always a possibility. However, the 
tone in which the Proposals were framed and subsequent commentary indicates the Crown's 
intention that there were particular issues identified upon which it was unwilling to move 
on.49 
In this part I will examme some of the key assumptions made by the Crown in the 
production of the Proposals. The common theme throughout the discussion is that the 
Crown's unilateral use of these assumptions affected the structure of the negotiations 
process in that it limited the boundaries of settlement. The structure having been affected 
so profoundly by the more powerful party has substantially reduced the fairness of the 
process of negotiation. As Saunders states "the act of definition of interests and objectives 
is a profoundly political act and not just an abstract academic exercise" . 50 
2.6 'Full and Final' Settlements 
One of the norms enunciated by the Crown in its Proposals (referred to above at page ) is 
that it has the duty to act in the best interests of all New Zealanders. The Crown believes 
that "the best interests of all New Zealanders" necessarily involves providing certainty, and 
a process by which New Zealand as a country can deal with Treaty grievances once and for 
all so that we may be able to move forward as a Nation. The first assumption that the 
Crown has made is that the best means of obtaining certainty is to impose that any 
settlements reached with iwi will be full and final. In fact, the Crown hopes to settle all 
major grievances by the year 2000.51 
49 For more about the consultation process, see Chapter Three below. 
50 Saunders, above at nl2, 255. 
51 The 1996/97 Ministry of Justice' s Corporate Plan includes, as the 'Vision' statement of the Office of 
Treaty Settlements, "To settle all major historical Treaty of Waitangi breaches by the year 2000". 
Structural Fairness of the Negotiations Process 3 1 
However, past attempts at guaranteeing 'full and final' settlements have not necessarily 
resulted in certainty. To illustrate, Mr David Lange cites the case of former attorney-
general HGR Mason who, in 1948:52 
told Parliament that the three great land claims of Waikato, New Plymouth, and 
Tauranga arising from the Maori wars had now been settled. The truth was that while 
they were settled with the affirmation of the parties involved and while they were 
protected by legislation, the settlements were so inequitable ... they became absolutely 
untenable." .. . the Bastion Point dispute was another case where settlement had been 
reached between the government and Ngati Whatua ... and, within 10 years, the 
Waitangi Tribunal had found the settlement faulty and further compensation and 
legislation was required. 
This shows that even if the finality of settlements is provided for in legislation, these are not 
necessarily safe from review. From a historical point of view, therefore, it can no longer 
safely be assumed that settlements can actually be made to "last forever" . 53 This probably 
reflects the nature of the problems created by colonisation which suggests that they cannot 
in a practical sense be equitably resolved by the mere swipe of a pen at one instant in time:
54 
It has to be accepted ... that we are dealing with long-term problems which have arisen 
from colonisation, a messy and hazardous affair that has left Maoris as economic 
orphans rather than treaty partners. 
The route to decolonisation is likely to be as inconvenient, if not hazardous, for the 
Crown as colonisation was for the Maori. 
52 "Lange sees no end to Maori claims" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 26 February 1994. 
53 M Chen Full and Final Settlements Between the Crown and Maori (Seminar paper produced for Te Puni 
Kokiri by Russell McVeagh McKenzie Bartleet & Co, Wellington, New Zealand, 11 May 1994) 7. 
54 S Jones "Waitangi and Maori political evolution" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 29 July 
1994. 
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On another level, the Waitangi Tribunal seems to be in no doubt that "full and final 
settlements for all time are inconsistent with the ongoing nature of the partnership 
established under the Treaty of Waitangi."55 
These comments should indicate that the imposition of full and final settlements by the 
Crown is not entirely appropriate. This seems to justify a review of the Crown's assumption 
that such a limitation on the settlement of Treaty grievances is appropriate. 
2.7 The 'Fiscal Cap' - Unilateral Definition by the Crown of 'affordability to the 
Community' 
Having made the initial assumption relating to full and final settlements, the Crown uses this 
to justify a second assumption that a limit must be set on the amount the Government will 
allocate for the resolution of Treaty grievances. The Crown's argument is that, as the 
significant burden of funding the resolution of Treaty grievances will rest with one 
generation of taxpaying New Zealanders, that amount must be one that they can realistically 
be expected to pay out. In the words of the Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi 
Negotiations, "The fund has to be big enough so we can get settlements that are durable and 
last, but not so big that it blows the country's budget apart."56 In other words, the Crown is 
asking itself what the country can actually afford to pay. I find the assumptions which the 
Crown has made in developing this aspect of the Proposals to be problematic for at least 
two reasons. 
Firstly, many Maori ask the question, "why should one generation of non-Maori pay the 
price to resolve the problems"?57 In making its assumption about an appropriate timeframe 
for settlement, the Crown has refused to acknowledge the viability of the alternative of 
spreading the costs of settlement over time. 58 This alternative is appealing to Maori because 
55 Chen, above at n53. 
56 "Maori grievances must be addressed, says Graham: Goodwill of all called for" Northern Advocate, 
Kaitaia, New Zealand, 28 May 1994. 
57 "Treaty envelope 'unlikely' to contain all the answers" Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 22 
November 1994. 
58 Jones, above at n54. 
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sometimes "the issue of who is going to pay stops people from thinking about some of the 
other real issues", 59 in this case how much can the current Government and one generation 
afford to allocate to Treaty settlements? Spreading the costs over time would ease the 
financial burden somewhat. 
Some iwi are also not fully prepared to present their claims for redress. A fixed quantum 
means that, there being only a finite amount to divide between iwi, the value of each 
settlement must be relative. However, if not all claims are lodged with the Waitangi 
Tribunal for determination as to the merit of their case, how can we know what we are 
dealing with let alone determine the relative value of each claim?:60 
We don't know what the injustices are, we don't know who the claimants are, and we 
can't quantify the costs. This seems to put a "full and final settlement' well out of 
reach. The injustices will not abate nor the pool of claimants shrink to fit the purse of 
the minister. 
In addition, the Crown's time frame for settlement is in a sense very arbitrary - why the year 
2000? Why not 2020? It seems that the time limit has been chosen more as "a major New 
year's resolution" than for any other reason: 61 
Secondly, based on settlement by the year 2000 of all major grievances, the Crown has 
made the unilateral assumption that $1 billion is the maximum amount that the country can 
afford. The writer agrees that the principle of affordability is an important consideration 
here. And Maori have indicated that they too believe affordability is important - it is not 
the intention of Maori to place unreasonable demands62 on the taxpaying public. Where the 
59 F Cassidy "What Can the Federal and Provincial Governments Do?" in F Cassidy (ed) Reaching Just 
settlements: Land Claims in British Columbia (Oolichan Books and the Institute for Research on Public 
Policy, 1991) 60- 66, 65. 
60 D Lange "An appearance of progress" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 31 January 1994. 
61 T Rangiheuea "The Role of Maori Women in Treay Negotiations and Settlements" (1995) 25 VUWLR 
195, 195. 
62 Chen, above at n53, 3. 
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Crown and Maori do differ, however, is in their definitions of affordability, and the Crown 
has yet to reveal the method it used for calculating the $1 billion quantum:63 
... The Proposal is not explicit on how a sum of one billion has been calculated but it is 
justified as a political decision largely on the basis of affordability and acceptability to 
the wider community ... neither the methodology used to calculate the amount, nor the 
basis for deciding viability has been disclosed .... conservative estimates suggest that 
the sum of one billion dollars falls well short of a reasonable and fair settlement price. 
2.8 Definition of Maori Interests Confined to 'Use' and 'Value' 
The final assumption that I wish to discuss under this heading relates to the Crown's 
proposal concerning natural resources. The Crown Proposals for Settlement of Treaty 
Claims states that "special rules must apply [to natural resources] because in general terms 
the Crown controls natural resources in the interests of all New Zealanders" .64 It lists four 
types of interest in a natural: ownership interest, use interest, value interest and regulatory 
interest, and then goes on to state that Maori interests, according to its interpretation of 
Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi,65 are confined only to 'use' and 'value' . 
This Crown proposal contains many underlying assumptions, not the least of which is an 
assumption that the Crown need only refer to the English version of Article II of the Treaty 
of Waitangi to ascertain the rights of iwi with respect to natural resources. However, iwi 
continually assert that according to the Maori version of the Treaty they did not concede 
ownership of natural resources, and that Article II in fact conveys a level of interest which 
63 Durie, above at n6, 113. 
64 Above at nl , 21. 
65 See n9 above. 
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goes well beyond use and value:66 
A refusal to contemplate Maori ownership of natural resources, even though 
acknowledging use and value interests, is contrary to the Treaty of Waitangi. The 
Courts have ... never explicitly ruled out Maori ownership. 
The attitude of the Crown towards the interpretation of Article II reflects "a colonial view 
of ownership" rather than upholding the concept Partnership that the Treaty embodies:67 
The Treaty of Waitangi was never intended to freeze Maori in a time warp. It was 
essentially about forward development, economic growth for Maori and Settlers and 
the opportunity to share new technologies. Yet.. . the Proposal... [ignores] the 
intentions of the Treaty and the expectation that Maori would share fully in the 
benefits of the new nation. 
The fact that these definitions were assumed without cross reference to Maori 
interpretations of the Treaty and without extensive and meaningful consultation with iwi 
again shows a deficiency in the process by which the Crown developed its Proposals. 
2.9 Summary 
The Court of Appeal has stated that the Treaty relationship between the Crown and iwi is 
best described as something akin to 'partnership'. 68 However, it is in real terms something 
much less. The issues raised above relating to the balance of power between the parties, the 
impact of norms and the use of assumptions by the Crown highlights some of the structural 
66 Durie, above at n6, 112. 
67 Durie, above at n6, 113 . 
68 Te Runanga o Whare Kauri re Kohu Incorporated v Attorney General & Others [1993] 2 NZLR 301. 
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deficiencies of the negotiations process. This combined with the discussion in Chapter One 
above about how the culture of ruling affects the Government's attitude toward and dealings 
with its Treaty Partner provides the foundations for the claim that the fairness of the 
Crown's negotiations process may be called into question. 
CHAPTER THREE 
'THE CROWN'S FAILURE TO MEET ITS TREATY 
OBLIGATION TO CONSULT' 
This Chapter discusses the Treaty obligation of the Crown with respect to consultation with 
iwi and how the Crown's culture of negotiating is deficient in terms of meeting those 
obligations. In addition to incompatibility with the Crown's duty to act in good faith, the 
conventional concept of negotiation that the Crown has chosen to adopt also denies 
recognition of the unique nature of the ongoing partnership between iwi and the Crown. 69 
3.1 The Treaty of Waitangi - The Fiduciary Nature of the Relationship between 
Maori and the Crown 
3 .1.1 Fiduciary Duty to Consult 
In Te Runanga o Whare Kauri re Kohu Incorporated v Attorney General & Others, Cooke 
P states his view that: 70 
the Treaty created an enduring relationship of a fiduciary nature akin to partnership, 
each party accepting a positive duty to act in good faith, fairly, reasonably and 
honorably towards the other. 
Cooke P's interpretation of the relationship between MAori and the Crown as Treaty 
Partners is further clarified when read in conjunction with his following comment made in 
69 See the discussion above on assumptions, Chapter Two, 2.5. 
70 [1993) 2 NZLR 301. 
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New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General:71 
the good faith owed to each other by the parties must extend to consultation on truly 
maJor issues. 
In terms of the production of the Proposals for the settlement of Treaty of Waitangi Claims 
with iwi, the courts have shown that the Crown owed Maori the duty to consult with them 
in a meaningful way on issues of major importance to Maori . 
Even though the Government put its Proposals out for consultation, indications were that it 
was not intended that such consultation would be made in the spirit of the Treaty, that is, in 
good faith . Iwi could be forgiven for feeling that the consultation rounds were nothing 
more than a token exercise. On several occasions, the Government indicated that it was not 
prepared to shift its position on several of its Proposals. For example, in 1994 the Minister 
in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations, Mr Douglas Graham, said that the 
Government would "shortly determine" the amount it is prepared to set aside in a "fiscal 
envelope". 72 _ 
The Minister also appeared to be unphased with the overwhelming iwi opposition to many 
of the Proposals, and indeed displayed an air of confidence indicating that such opposition 
would have no effect on the final Crown settlement policy: 73 
The amount of the financial cap contained in the fiscal envelope is expected to be 
announced within a few weeks .... However, Mr Graham says it is for the Government 
to fix the envelope and Maoridom will not be asked to agree to it. 
In addition to the lack of good faith of the Crown consultation process was the issue of 
· 74 resourcmg: 
71 [1989] 2 NZLR 142, 152. 
72 "Treaty limit proposal draws flak" Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 31 January 1994. 
73 "Setting Treaty claim limits" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 15 July 1994. 
74 J Chadwick, Radio New Zealand "Mana News" 31 January 1995 
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But what [Maori] were really complaining about is that instead of sitting down and 
saying let's work out together how to get rid of all these claims, you get a unilateral 
approach and say well here's my proposal, now what's yours. What they're saying is 
if you're going to spend money to resolve something then why don't we do it 
together rather than you spend it on your one and then throw it at us and we have to 
go and look for money to work out ours. 
This factor in turn led to the Government's approach to settling treaty grievances being 
labelled as "arrogant", 75 and the proposals themselves as a "fait accompli" . 76 Criticism of 
the Government approach to the production of the fiscal envelope proposals echoed 
concerns voiced about the national hui undertaken to obtain ratification of iwi and hapu 
consent for purchase of the fishing quota owned by Sealord Fisheries Limited in 1992. 77 
In an attempt to address these comments, the Government alluded to the "great deal of 
intellectual firepower" that went into developing the proposals, citing, for example, the 
Crown's "direct negotiations with a number of claimants over the last few years" .78 
However, these negotiations had been progressed with a view to settling grievances on an 
iwi-by-iwi basis; on the other hand, the Government's fiscal envelope proposals would apply 
across iwi, at a pan-tribal level. The application of policy at this level raises additional 
issues for Maori which may or may not have been sufficiently discussed or canvassed in 
these "direct negotiations" alluded to by the Government. The Crown also seemed 
confident that it had sufficiently incorporated the interests and concerns of Maori on this 
issue, referring to the consideration of quality advice received from Te Puni K{>kiri 
regarding the proposals. 79 
75Taumata Kaumatua o Ngapuhi Nui Tonu spokesman K.ingi Taurua, "Crown fiscal envelope proposal 
'arrogant'" Northern News, Wellington, New Zealand, 15 December 1994. 
76 S Jones Radio New Zealand "Mana News ", 31 January 1995. 
77 For further information, see Munro, above at n19, particularly 37. 
78 Minister of Justice, D Graham Radio New Zealand "Checkpoint", 30 January 1995. 
79 The Ministry of Maori Development. See Comment by D Graham, Minister of Justice, Above at n78. 
However, no matter how competent and sound the advice, it remains that (1) a Government department will 
never be perceived as independent, and (2) one can only speculate as to the extent Te Puni Kokiri's advice 
was actually followed in the process. 
• • • • 
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3.1.2 Requirement for 'Meaningful Consultation' Paramount 
This writer believes that it remains to be shown whether the Crown's approach to 
consultation with iwi on its Proposals for settlement of Treaty claims satisfied the 
requirements of fairness. The author is therefore reluctant to conclude that the Crown 
satisfied the requirement of 'meaningful' consultation. Meaningful consultation as a 
concept suggests to this writer that merely presenting policy proposals to iwi for their 
consideration and feedback is not sufficient. 
This writer suggests that, preliminary step required to be undertaken is for the Crown and 
Maori to enter into exploratory discussions about an appropriate framework or principles 
which will guide the process of developing proposals for the settlement of Treaty claims. 
Such discussions would necessarily include a process of defining the conflict to be resolved 
between the parties, and there is an obvious conflict between the Crown and Maori 
regarding the ways in which Treaty grievances ought to be resolved. Defining the conflict is 
important because it determines the issues that will be addressed, and those that will be left 
off the agenda for discussion. This ultimately leads to unsatisfactory outcomes and the 
relitigation of settlements: 80 
an incorrect definition of the cause of a serious conflict leads to the adoption of 
procedures of management that are inconsistent with the realities of that conflict. The 
procedures are, therefore, likely to be unsuccessful. .. .Indeed, it can reasonably be 
argued that all levels of conflict may be protracted, not necessarily or merely because 
of their inherent complexities, but because of the ways in which they have been 
initially defined, and because of the means employed to manage them . 
In addition, meaningful consultation would increase the potential for canvassing all the 
options and the durable nature of settlements. At present, the Government could be 
criticized for sacrificing iwi acceptability of the boundaries and processes of negotiation 
80 Burton, above at n3, 21. 
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( and thereby the long term benefits of increased durability of settlements) for "the 
appearance of progress"81 in the short term. As Ury and Smoke write:
82 
An inadequate grasp of the long-term stakes in a crisis can sometimes lead decision-
makers to raise the stakes deliberately in the short term, in ways that they later regret. 
... All too often parties calculate potential short-term gains without adequately 
appreciating possible long-term losses. 
In general terms, more appropriate Crown action may have been first to communicate its 
willingness to Maori to establish a mutually agreeable process of developing a framework 
and principles for settlement of treaty claims (including the process of negotiation). This 
would be an approach consistent with the international trends for inclusive processes of 
negotiation with indigenous peoples that appear to be evolving. Canada, for example, is 
proactive in the area of establishing mutually agreeable processes of negotiation with its 
indigenous population, or First Nations groups. As an example, its British Columbia Treaty 
Commission83 was created to "guide and facilitate negotiations, .. . and where the parties 
agree, other related agreements."84 As preliminary steps, the Commission:
85 
receives a statement of intent to negotiate from First Nations plus any requests for 
funding ... [lt] must allocate funds to enable First Nations to participate m 
negotiations. [It] is also charged with assessing the readiness of the parties to 
commence negotiation of a framework agreement. .. [ and assesses whether each of the 
81 Lange, above at n60. 
82 W Ury and R Smoke "Anatomy of Crisis" (1985) 1 Negotiation Jnl 93, 94-5. 
83 Established by September 1992 upon recommendation of the British Columbia Claims Task Force in 
1991, and by resolution of the Assembly of First Nations Summit, the Federal Government of Canada and 
the Province of British Columbia - see C Wickliffe Indigenous Claims and the process of Negotiation and 
Settlement in Countries with Jurisdictions and Populations Comparable to New Zealand's (Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment, 1994) 53. 
84 Wickliffe, above at n83, 53-4. 
85 Ibid. It should also be noted that the Commission is an independent body with considerable powers to 
facilitate the expeditious resolution of claims of indigenous groups in British Columbia. The establishment 
of such a Commission would also facilitate a greater balance of power in negotiations between Governments 
and indigenous groups. 
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parties has] adopted a ratification procedure and that they have identified the 
substantive and procedural matters to be negotiated. 
Considering the Crown's past experience with negotiations, and the significant body of 
writing and research available to the Crown on more effective models of negotiation, the 
conclusion is that the Crown has yet to provide the concept of 'adequate consultation with 
tangata whenua' the respect it deserves . 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
'THE NEED FOR A MORE PROBLEM-SOLVING 
APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS' 
4.1 Introduction 
If nothing else, the Crown Proposals episode has shown that at present, iwi and the 
Government are in conflict as to how Treaty claims settlements ought to be negotiated. Of 
the concept of 'conflict resolution', Burton (1987) writes that it:86 
refers to the facilitated analysis of the underlying sources of conflict situations by the 
parties in conflict. The term also encompasses the process whereby institutional and 
policy options are discovered that meet the needs of the parties, thus establishing the 
basis for a resolution of the conflict. 
Chapters Two and Three above highlight some of the inadequacies of the Crown approach 
to negotiating with iwi, more particularly the preparatory stages for negotiation. This 
section makes some suggestions for enhancing the fairness of a process of negotiation 
between the Treaty Partners. 
4.2 Balancing Negotiating Power between the Parties 
In Burton's view, there is a growing ideology which favours a more problem-solving 
approach rather than "the traditional approach of power bargaining, negotiation, and the 
settlement of disputes", 87 the latter being preferred by the more powerful of potential parties 
86 Burton, above at n3 , p7. 
87 Burton, above at n3 , pll . 
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to negotiations due to their ability to coerce the weaker parties and influence the final 
outcome. However, " 'resolution' is not the result of a compromise or an enforced 
decision". 88 Therefore, to achieve a 'resolution' in the true sense of the word, the ability of 
one party to coerce the other and influence the final outcome must be reduced. 
This reqmres that the inequality of power between the parties needs to somehow be 
addressed to establish an equitable starting point for negotiations and enhance durability of 
any 'settlements'. Burton suggests that the inclusion of a neutral third party in the 
negotiations process would help balance the power in the interaction between the parties. 89 
The inclusion of a facilitator in the process of negotiations between iwi and the Crown, as 
with other indigenous peoples and Governments, may be appropriate given the significant 
imbalance of power between them, and considering that Governments have a tendency to be 
attracted to a more traditional, win-lose form of negotiation that typically results in 
unsatisfactory outcomes for the weaker party. 
4.3 A Framework for Government Policy 
" 
One major criticism of the Crown's Proposals for settlement of Treaty grievances is that it 
was unclear as to what the underlying framework for the Proposals was. This part of the 
paper contends that there is an urgent need for any proposals regai ding the resolution of 
Treaty claims to have their base in a coherent and mutually agreeable framework, more to 
the point a Treaty framework. This is because the growing trend in negotiations concerning 
natural resources is for indigenous groups to raise issues varying from sovereignty and 
constitutional arrangements, to the recognition of ownership of resources and the right to 
self governance. 
However, although recognition of such issues as appropriate and legitimate for discussion in 
the context of negotiation processes has featured in countries such as Canada, 90 the same 
88 Burton, above at n86 . 
89 Burton, above at n86. 
90 C Whitcliffe Radio New Zealand "Mana News ", 8 December 1994 . 
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cannot be said for New Zealand models.91 This is clearly evidenced by the following 
comment made by the Minister of Justice, New Zealand, in regard to Maori reaction to the 
fiscal envelope proposals:92 
There seems to have been a great deal of emphasis put on Maori sovereignty 
issues ... Now those matters relate to the rights of indigenous people and are taking 
place in America with First Nation people and in Australia with the Aborigines .. . But 
they're not matters which are involved directly with the [Government's fiscal 
envelope] proposals ... Those proposals relate to trying to settle outstanding [treaty] 
grievances ... and whether there should be a separate Maori Parliament or not doesn't 
seem to me to be terribly relevant to that. 
The above view is in stark contrast with other comments of the day. Professor Mason 
Durie, for example, Spokesperson for the Hui held 29 January 1995 in Turangi to discuss 
the fiscal envelope proposals, commented that the Government's fiscal envelope proposals 
"lacked any coherent framework", and further suggested that the Government's reactive and 
ad hoe approach to the settlement of treaty claims required urgent attention in the form of 
discussions involving both Maori and the Crown. 93 The views of another well-respected 
Maori commentator, Moana Jackson, suggests that, by failing to acknowledge 
constitutional and sovereignty issues raised by Maori as sufficiently relevant to what the 
Government had proposed for the settlement of treaty claims, the Crown has sent a strong 
message to Maori about the importance that it ascribe to the treaty as the founding 
document of Aotearoa. 94 
Commentators outside New Zealand also support the plight of indigenous people to obtain 
acceptance from their country's Governments that they need to accommodate more the 
91 Wickliffe, above at n84, 10. 
92 Graham, above at n78. 
93 Radio New Zealand 2ZB "Paul Brennan ", 30 January 1995. 
94 Radio New Zealand "Mana News", 31 January 1995. 
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, d' l ' fr k 95 m 1genous peop es amewor s: 
People and entities, such as governments and mtrung comparues, dealing with 
Aboriginal people need to accept that if they wish to negotiate with an Aboriginal 
community the need to do so within the frameworks that Aboriginal people find 
acceptable. While this may appear a radical idea, it is no different than expecting 
Aboriginal people to operate only within the framework of the imposed legal system. 
In addition, British Columbia has made much progress in the area of enhancing indigenous 
peoples' meaningful involvement in negotiations. In 1991 , the British Columbia Claims 
Task Force made a number of recommendations to the Government of British Columbia on 
how to deal with native claims. These recommendations included:
96 
... that during negotiations each party should feel free to introduce new issues which 
it feels are significant to the new relationship. 
Although this recommendation was made in relation to negotiations proper, it could just as 
well be applied to the preparatory stage of negotiations between iwi and the Crown as 
exploratory discussions evolve and new issues are raised, and in particular to discussions 
concerning a framework for the settlements policy. It is also emphasized that it is only the 
introduction of such issues that the BCTCF recommends here. A process for finally 
determining the components of any policy framework (and as far as possible a mutually-
acceptable framework) is another separate matter. 
This writer contends that issues of such obvious importance to one party concerning the 
establishment of a culturally acceptable framework ought not be dismissed by the other 
without further consideration as to the implications that action will hold for negotiating a 
mutually acceptable settlement, and the processes for achieving such settlements. Allowing 
one party to voice and express issues that they consider important to them, as they see 
95 Behrendt, above at n24, 6. 
96 Wickliffe, above at n84, 51. 
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them, is empowering. Receiving acknowledgment of the existence of these issues from the 
other party can therefore only be conducive to their relationship. 
In light of the fiduciary nature of the Crown's obligations under the Treaty as discussed 
above, the Crown needs to secure a significant measure of acceptance of the Crown policy 
for settlement of Treaty claims from iwi. It is argued that for any detailed policy to be 
acceptable to Maori, it is both fundamental and imperative that they be based on a Treaty 
framework. Acceptability of the underpinning framework would also enhance the durability 
of any settlement. 
4.4 Reviewable Settlements 
The writer above discussed the assumption of the Crown that, to enhance acceptability of 
the Proposals by New Zealanders, the settlement of Treaty claims must be full and final.
97 
The discussion showed that this assumption has yet to be tested, and in fact that there is 
strong argument favouring alternatives to full and final settlements which the Crown needs 
to explore further. 
It is proposed that the Crown should do away with the 'full and final' descriptor, and 
change the focus not on settling claims, but healing grievances. The Waitangi Tribunal 
supports such an approach:98 
Treaty settlements of this kind should not be expressed in finite terms but defined by 
reference to goals .... and provision should be made for regular checks, and for 
adjustments if the goals are not being achieved. 
The use of economic, cultural and social indicators of the particular iwi claimant may prove 
helpful in determining over time whether the outcome of any negotiations could be 
categorized as fair. This is offered as an alternative to the Crown's approach to give 
97 See Chapter Two, 2.6. 
98 Chen, above at n53, 11. 
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legitimacy and therefore enhance durability of the outcomes of negotiations between Maori 
and the Crown. 
As the Treaty relationship between the Crown and iwi is ongoing, this would also imply a 
review from time to time of the relationship, including its component parts such as the 
outcomes of any negotiations. The concept of ' reviewal' has major benefits for both iwi 
and the Crown in that they do not have to think of every possible factor that may impact on 
the fairness of an outcome. For example, the issue of distribution of assets to iwi has 
become of enormous concern to iwi and the Crown:99 
Two years after the Sealord fisheries deal squabbles persist about how the proceeds 
won from the seas will be split up. Papers released yesterday by the Treaty of 
Waitangi Fisheries Commission underline the unsatisfactory situation that has been 
reached. The initiative was meant to benefit all Maoris, yet "allocation models" 
prepared by the commission do not provide benefits for those who do not know their 
tribal affiliations. 
.. . Should the Government have foreseen these problems and itself produced guidelines 
for sharing the benefits of the deal? ... In a classic case of discretion being the better 
part of valor it decided to leave Maoridom to sort things out. 
It took some time before the parties came to appreciate the complexity of this particular 
problem. \Vho can foresee what other problems might also arise, and when? It may 
therefore be some time before we will know for certain whether outcomes to negotiations 
will be 'fair' . 
99 "Lessons to be learned from Sealord wrangle" The Daily Post, New Zealand, August 11 1994. 
• 
CONCLUSION 
It has been said that Maoridom's rejection of the Government's proposals for settling treaty 
claims was a "foregone conclusion". 100 Maori's resounding negative reaction of to these 
Proposals led to great debate about the substance of the Proposals themselves and the 
legitimacy of the process by which they were developed. In summary, Maori were, and 
continue to be, faced with a non-negotiable, unilaterally-formulated package imposed upon 
them without any prior consultation, to which they are asked to 'react', with scarce financial 
and human resources, and in the knowledge that their iwi and hapu will only suffer further if 
restoration of their economic base is unnecessarily delayed. 
The Government's culture of ruling has been a maJor determining factor on how it 
approached the development of its Proposals for settlement of Treaty claims. The 
conventional system of power-bargaining employed by the Crown is, for a number of 
reasons, not only inadequate and inappropriate for negotiations with iwi, but more 
importantly creates an air of illegitimacy of the negotiations with iwi upon which it embarks. 
The balance of power in favour of the Crown precludes any notion of the Crown acting in 
;ood faith toward the other negotiating party. These and other structural factors have 
combined to result in a huge volume of commentary and critique from Maori and non-Maori 
alike concerning the fairness of the negotiations process. In this kind of environment future 
generations of Maori will continue to challenge even so-called 'full and final' settlements. 
If the Government genuinely wishes to fairly and equitably resolve Treaty grievances with 
iwi, it would do well to review its current approach. A more problem-solving method is 
offered by this writer as an alternative which holds great potential for addressing some of 
the problems with the Crown's Proposals for settlement of Treaty claims identified in this 
paper. However, the single most important action that the Crown can take is to talk openly 
and honestly with iwi about an approach which they may find agreeable instead of 
unilaterally imposing conditions. This will only result in a dramatic reduction in the fairness 
100 J Chadwick Radio New Zealand "Mana News", 31 January 1995. 
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of outcomes for iwi, and it is an approach which the Crown cannot, in all good faith, 
continue to advocate. 
• • • 
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